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1. Introduction
The case discussed here is the result of the actions of two individuals, Edward
Snowden and Maximilian Schrems. In 2013, Snowden exposed several
programs, run by United States (US) intelligence agencies, capable of
collecting, storing, and analysing personal data of both US citizens and others
on an unprecedented scale. These revelations severely shook the trust of
European citizens in the online activities of governments. The outrage did not
immediately lead to legal action from the EU, but the Commission did initiate
a review of Safe Harbour, the Commission decision under which personal
data can be transferred from the EU to the US.1 Using the information released
by Snowden, Mr Schrems, an Austrian, lodged a complaint with the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner about the transfers of his personal data by Facebook
Ireland ltd to the US under the Safe Harbour decision, Commission Decision
2000/520. The Commissioner felt bound to the Commission’s assessment in
the Safe Harbour decision on the adequacy of personal data protection in the
US and rejected the complaint. The Irish High Court, to which Mr Schrems
appealed, was less sure. Although it held that the Commissioner acted in
accordance with the letter of Directive 95/46 on data protection and Decision
2000/520, it was highly critical of “the mass and undifferentiated accessing by
State authorities of personal data” which was deemed to be contrary to the
1. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC on
the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, O.J. 2000, L 215/7.
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fundamental values protected by the Irish Constitution.2 Therefore it doubted
whether the current implementation of Safe Harbour can withstand scrutiny
under EU law, having regard to Article 7 and Article 8 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, and referred the case to the ECJ.
The fact that it was the actions of two individuals that led ultimately to the
Court striking down Safe Harbour is by no means a mere curiosity of this case;
it illustrates the inability or unwillingness of the institutions and public bodies
to take forceful action to protect the right to personal data protection when
data is transferred to third countries. At the same time, it reflects well on the
EU legal system that individuals were in fact able to set in motion such a chain
of events.
This judgment is about finding the appropriate institutional and legal
design for protecting individuals confronted with international transfers of
their personal data. The Court seems highly concerned that free online
activities of European individuals are turned into forms of institutional
domination. In line with the referring court, which sees in the US activities
“the gloomy echoes of the mass state surveillance programmes conducted in
totalitarian states such as the German Democratic Republic of Ulbricht and
Honecker”,3 it intends to ensure that the high level of protection guaranteed to
individuals within the EU “continues where personal data is transferred to a
third country”.4 The challenge confronting the Court, therefore, was twofold.
It was, firstly, to find appropriate forms of institutional protection, in the
circumstances that the credibility of the Commission was contested. It was,
secondly, for the EU to remain a constructive player in the international arena
where there are legal and political incentives to balance the requirement of
individual protection with other competing interests such as free trade and
international security.
2. Background
The two provisions of Directive 95/46 most relevant to this case are Articles
25 and 28. Article 25 determines the conditions under which personal data
may be transferred to third countries. Article 28 regulates the tasks and
responsibilities of the independent national supervisory authorities that
monitor the application of the Directive in their respective Member States.The
2. Directive 95/46/EC of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O.J. 1995, L 281/31.
3. High Court of Ireland,Maximillian Schrems v.Data Protection Commissioner, judgment
of 18 June 2014, [2014] IEHC 310, para 53.
4. Judgment, para 72.
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Directive should of course be seen in the light of Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter.
Article 25(1) lays down the core principle: Member States may only allow
the transfer of personal data to third countries if that third country ensures an
adequate level of protection.5 Notably absent from paragraph 1 is an
indication of who can make a binding negative or positive assessment about
the level of protection in a third country. Article 25(3) requires that Member
States and the Commission inform each other where they consider that a third
country does not ensure an adequate level of protection. When the
Commission is of that opinion, Member States should prevent personal data
transfers to that country (Art. 25(4)). At the appropriate time, the Commission
should enter into negotiations with the third country (Art. 25(5)).Article 25(6)
describes the opposite situation, namely when the Commission finds that a
third country ensures an adequate level of protection, by reason of its domestic
law or international commitments. Member States should comply with that
finding.
Personal data transfers may take place to third countries that do not offer an
adequate level of protection on the basis of a number of exceptions found in
Article 26 of the Directive; one such exception is the unambiguous consent of
the data subject. More importantly, international data transfers may take place
on the basis of Model Contract Clauses (Art. 26(4)) or Binding Corporate
Rules (Art. 26(2)). Model Contract Clauses, as approved by the Commission,
can be used by organizations to adduce adequate safeguards for the right to
privacy for transfers of data to another organization in a third country. Binding
Corporate Rules can be adopted by an organization wanting to send personal
data to a third country but within the organization itself. These rules must be
approved by a national supervisory authority.
On 26 July 2000, the Commission adopted Decision 2000/520 establishing
that the US ensures adequate personal data protection for organizations that
subscribe to the Safe Harbour Principles. The adequacy decision of the
Commission therefore does not establish that the US as such ensures an
adequate level of personal data protection, but it is limited to organizations
and private actors that have agreed to conform to the Safe Harbour Principles.
These Principles were adopted by the US Department of Commerce and are
included in Decision 2000/520. The Safe Harbour Principles follow the
5. The rules on transferring personal data to third countries should be viewed in conjunction
with the rules on applicable law as contained in Art. 4 of the Directive. See further Kuner,
Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (OUP, 2013), p. 128. See also Colonna,
“Article 4 of the EU Data Protection Directive and the irrelevance of the EU–US Safe Harbor
Program?”, 4 International Data Privacy Law (2014), at 203–221. Arts. 4 and 28 of the
Directive were the subject of another case before the Court just before Schrems:Case C-230/14,
Weltimmo v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, EU:C:2015:639.
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substantive requirements of data protection as laid down in the Directive to
some extent, for example concerning notification and consent, access to data
by the data subject, data integrity, and data security. The Principles are
expanded upon in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s), developed by the
Department of Commerce and also attached to Decision 2000/520 as annex.
The Safe Harbour Principles are based on voluntary participation. An
organization participates if it has “publicly disclosed its commitment to
comply with the Principles”,6 and has self-certified “its adherence to the
Principles implemented in accordance with the FAQs”.7 Enforcement is
organized at two levels. Firstly, organizations may join a self-regulatory
privacy program that follows the Principles or they may develop their own
privacy policies that adhere to the Principles.8 Secondly, the US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) can, in accordance with its mandate of preventing unfair
and deceptive acts and practices affecting commerce, investigate compliance
with the Principles and, if necessary, issue fines: “the FTC takes the position
that misrepresenting why information is being collected from consumers or
how the information will be used constitutes a deceptive practice”.9 In other
words, whilst subscribing to the Safe Harbour Principles is voluntary,
adherence to them once an organization has done so, is not.
The fact that the Safe Harbour Principles are based on a declaration by an
organization in order to become effective and are not based on US law (except
indirectly, for enforcement) raises the question about their effectiveness in
case of counteracting legal obligations. This question is unambiguously
answered in the Principles: “Adherence to these Principles may be limited:
(a) to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements; (b) by statute, government regulation, or case law
that create conflicting obligations or explicit authorizations, provided that, in
exercising any such authorization, an organization can demonstrate that its
non-compliance with the Principles is limited to the extent necessary to meet
the overriding legitimate interests furthered by such authorization”.10 Also a
letter from the Department of Commerce concerning explicit authorizations
states that: “we owe deference to the legislative prerogatives of our elected
lawmakers”.11 It is therefore clear that organizations complying with legal
obligations arising from US law thereby do not violate the Safe Harbour
Principles, and that the US has moreover no duty to refrain from creating legal
obligations that contradict these Principles.
6. Art. 1(2)(a) of Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, O.J. 2000, L 215/7.
7. Ibid., Art. 1(3).
8. Ibid., Annex I.
9. Ibid., Annex III.
10. Ibid., Annex I.
11. Ibid., Annex IV.
CML Rev. 20161346 Case law
The number of organizations participating in Safe Harbour has steadily
grown over the years, from 401 in 2003 to several thousand in 2015.12 The
actual implementation of the Safe Harbour Principles has not been an
unqualified success. In a 2004 review of Safe Harbour, the Commission noted
that: “a relevant number of the reviewed US organizations seem to have
difficulties in correctly translating the Safe Harbour principles into their data
processing policies”.13 Violations of data protection rights by the US
Government were hardly an issue at the time, with one study in 2004
concluding that “[t]he controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are
essentially irrelevant for SH [Safe Harbour] data flows”, even though the
study took note of the “broad powers” of intelligence agencies to get secret
court orders for the production of business records.14
Those broad powers and the secrecy with which they were employed were
then at the heart of the Snowden revelations, starting in June 2013. The first of
many publications concerned a court order to telecom provider Verizon for
“all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for
communications between the United States and abroad” or “wholly within the
United States, including local telephone calls”.15 Further publications
revealed the existence of the PRISM-program, under which several internet
companies (including Facebook) provided US intelligence agencies direct
access to personal data.The publications also disclosed the participation of the
British intelligence agency GCHQ in some of these activities.
The Commission then sent two communications to the European
Parliament and Council in November 2013. One of them was a review of Safe
Harbour, the other was on “Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows”.16 The
Commission found that “[l]arge-scale US intelligence collection
programmes, such as PRISM affect the fundamental rights of Europeans” and
that Safe Harbour acts as a “conduit” for data transfers to companies required
12. Dhont, Asinari and Poullet, “Safe harbour implementation study” (2004), available at
<ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/studies/files/safe-harbour-2004_en.pdf> (all
websites last accessed 14 July 2016), 26.
13. Commission Staff Working Document of 20 Oct. 2004 on the implementation of
Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of personal data provided by
the Safe Harbour privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the US
Department of Commerce, SEC(2004)1323, at 7.
14. Dhont, Asinari and Poullet, op. cit. supra note 12, at 104.
15. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, court order ofApril 2013, in Greenwald, “NSA
collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily”, The Guardian, 6 June 2013,
available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-
order>.
16. Commission Communication of 27 Nov. 2013 on rebuilding trust in EU-US data flows,
COM(2013)846 final. Commission Communication of 27 Nov. 2013 on the functioning of the
Safe Harbour from the perspective of EU citizens and companies established in the EU,
COM(2013)847 final.
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to give access to personal data to US intelligence agencies.17 The conclusion
was that “[g]iven the weaknesses identified, the current implementation of
Safe Harbour cannot be maintained. However, its revocation would adversely
affect the interests of member companies in the EU and in the US”.18 Instead,
the Commission wanted to strengthen Safe Harbour through re-negotiations
with the US.
Mr Schrems had already lodged several complaints with the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner (DPC) about the privacy policies of Facebook when
the Snowden publications appeared. Schrems then asked the DPC to conduct
further investigations, to ensure that Safe Harbour was interpreted in line with
the Directive and fundamental rights, and, despite the odd nature of this latter
question, to “review” the validity of Decision 2000/520.19
The office of the DPC is established under national legislation
implementing Article 28 of Directive 95/46. An important element of the EU
data protection regime is the use of independent national supervisory
authorities. Their position was entrenched by the Charter, as independent
supervision was introduced as an element of the right to personal data
protection in Article 8(3).20 The competences of the national supervisory
authorities are outlined in Article 28(3) of the Directive and include:
investigate powers, effective powers of intervention, and the power to engage
in legal proceedings. National supervisory authorities moreover shall hear
claims by individuals regarding their right to personal data protection (Art.
28(4)).
The DPC decided not to make use of its powers in response to the
complaints by Schrems. Section 11 of the Irish Data Protection Act of 1988
prescribes that if a “Community finding” has been made concerning the
adequacy of the level of protection in a third country, that finding is binding
insofar as it concerns the implementation of the Act. Hence, the complaint
was found to be “frivolous or vexatious” in the sense that it was unsustainable
in law.21
Schrems appealed to the High Court. In its decision, the High Court first
examined Irish law: “If this matter were entirely governed by Irish law, then,
measured by these constitutional standards, a significant issue would arise as
17. Commission Communication of 27 Nov. 2013 on rebuilding trust in EU-US data flows,
COM(2013)846 final, at 6.
18. Ibid., at 7.
19. It should be clear that a DPC does not have the ability to review a Commission decision.
An overview of the complaints can be found at <europe-v-facebook.org>.
20. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. 2000, C 364/01 and O.J.
2010, C 83/389.
21. High Court of Ireland, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, cited
supra note 3.
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to whether the United States ‘ensures an adequate level of protection …’[and]
this would indeed have been a matter which the Commissioner would have
been obliged further to investigate”.22 Nevertheless, it acknowledged, “that
the matter is only partially governed by Irish law”. Under EU law, the High
Court held, the safeguards of data protection are even more explicit than under
Irish law, citing Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, as well as the recent decision
inDigital Rights Ireland.23 The High Court thus decided to refer the following
questions to the ECJ: “Whether in the course of determining a complaint
which has been made to an independent office holder who has been vested by
statute with the functions of administering and enforcing data protection
legislation that personal data is being transferred to another third country (in
this case, the United States of America) the laws and practices of which, it is
claimed, do not contain adequate protections for the data subject, that office
holder is absolutely bound by the Community finding to the contrary
contained in [Decision 2000/520) having regard to Article 7 and Article 8 of
[the Charter], the provisions of Article 25(6) of [the Directive]
notwithstanding? Or, alternatively, may the office holder conduct his or her
own investigation of the matter in the light of factual developments in the
meantime since that Commission Decision was first published?”
3. The Opinion ofAdvocate General Bot
Although the Court and Advocate General Bot disagreed on a few points, they
argued mostly along the same lines. Both favoured a strong role for national
data protection authorities, allow for only a narrow margin of discretion in
assessing adequacy, and held that “adequate” in the Directive must be
interpreted as “essentially equivalent to EU standards”. Most importantly,
after answering the question referred, both the Advocate General and the
Court assessed the validity of Decision 2000/520 and both came to a negative
conclusion. Moreover, the Court referred several times directly to the Opinion
of Advocate General Bot.
The first move by the Advocate General was to broaden the question.
Whereas the High Court asked whether the Commissioner is “absolutely
bound” by an adequacy decision of the Commission, the Advocate General
saw an opportunity to clarify the tasks of both the national supervisory
authorities and the Commission when faced with shortcomings in the
22. Ibid., para 56.
23. Ibid., paras. 61–62; Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland,
EU:C:2014:238.
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application of Decision 2000/520.24 The Advocate General saw two distinct
parts in the obligation of the national supervisory authorities.25 The first is to
investigate and the second is to suspend data transfers, if necessary.
The authority and obligation for a national supervisory authority to
investigate the adequacy of third countries with respect to the level of personal
data protection is to be found in Article 28. A Commission adequacy decision
based on Article 25 cannot limit the authority of a national supervisory
authority to conduct an investigation. There is no indication of a hierarchical
relationship between Articles 28 and 25. Moreover, there is a right to an
independent authority for data protection, as enshrined in Article 8(3) of the
Charter, also covering transfers of personal data to third countries; excluding
transfers of data from the investigative competences of the national
supervisory authorities would unduly limit that right.
If a national supervisory authority finds that a third country does not ensure
an adequate level of protection, “it has the power to suspend the transfer of
data in question, irrespective of the general assessment made by the
Commission in its decision”.26 To be sure, adequacy decisions are binding on
the Member States as is the case for all EU decisions according to Article 288
TEU. However, it follows from the scheme of Article 25, and from Article
25(3) in particular, that “the finding that a third country does or does not
ensure an adequate level of protection may be made either by the Member
States or by the Commission”.27 There is no exclusive power conferred on the
Commission in that regard.
The Advocate General repeatedly emphasized that the Directive must be
interpreted so as to achieve a high level of personal data protection. Placing
personal data transfers in that context, the Advocate General saw a parallel
with the Court’s reasoning in N.S..28 In that decision the Court held that,
concerning the transfer of asylum seekers to the Member State primarily
responsible, “it must be assumed that the treatment of asylum seekers in all
Member States complies with the requirements [of fundamental rights]”.29
However, this assumption is not unassailable. When a Member State cannot be
unaware of systemic deficiencies in the human rights record of the other
Member States that amount to “substantial grounds for believing that the
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or
degrading treatment”,30 it may not transfer the asylum seeker to that Member
24. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-362/14, Schrems, EU:C:2015:627, para 5.
25. Ibid., para 51.
26. Ibid., para 81.
27. Ibid., para 86.
28. Ibid., paras. 100–105; Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10,N.S. and Others, EU:C:2011:865.
29. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S. and Others, para 80.
30. Ibid., para 94.
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State. Accordingly, the Advocate General saw an adequacy decision by the
Commission as a rebuttable presumption.31 In case of systemic deficiencies in
personal data protection in a third country, a Member State must intervene to
safeguard fundamental rights. Decision 2000/520 already contains a safety
valve in Article 3(1)(b), but the conditions imposed therein strictly
circumscribe the powers of the national supervisory authorities and thus
cannot be interpreted as preventing the supervisory authorities from
exercising their competences as found in Article 28(3) of the Directive.32
The Advocate General then embarked on an assessment of the validity of
Decision 2000/520. He noted that although the validity was not directly
questioned before the High Court, it should nonetheless be examined, as it is
clear that it is at the heart of the case.33 However two procedural aspects must
be clarified. Firstly, the examination must necessarily be limited, as not all
aspects of the Safe Harbour scheme have been discussed in the present
proceedings. Secondly, the Advocate General argued that although generally
the legality of a measure must be assessed in light of the facts when the
measure was adopted, that approach cannot be applied to adequacy decisions,
as they concern the ongoing obligation to protect fundamental rights.34
Given the importance of the phrase “an adequate level of protection”,
especially for future cases, it is surprising that the Advocate General spent
little time on its meaning. Of primary importance for the Advocate General
was that the interpretation must take account of the role of personal data
protection with regard to the fundamental right to privacy.35 According to the
Advocate General, the objective of Article 25 is thus “to ensure the continuity
of the protection afforded by that directive where personal data is transferred
to a third country”.36 Therefore, “an adequate level of protection” must mean
here “essentially equivalent to that afforded by the Directive”.37
The Advocate General began the assessment of Decision 2000/520 with
two findings of fact, as made by the High Court and supported by the
Commission itself. First, US intelligence agencies are capable of accessing
personal data transferred to the US and, second, EU citizens have no effective
31. Opinion, para 104.
32. Ibid., para 114.
33. This argument is not entirely convincing. When Digital Rights Ireland requested to join
the proceedings as an amicus curiae, it also urged that questions on the validity of the Directive
and Safe Harbour decisions be added to the reference for a preliminary ruling. Justice Hogan
refused on the ground that “the addition of these questions would radically change the nature of
the proceedings”. See High Court of Ireland, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner, judgment of 16 July 2014, [2014] IEHC 351, para 38.
34. Opinion, paras. 131–138.
35. Ibid., para 140.
36. Ibid., para 139.
37. Ibid., para 141.
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right to be heard on this matter.38 This demonstrates that the Decision does not
contain sufficient guarantees.39 It follows that the fundamental rights
protected by Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter are interfered with.40
The Advocate General first considered that the derogations found in the
Safe Harbour Principles are formulated too broadly and therefore cannot be
held to pursue an objective of general interest, except for the derogation
regarding national security.41 The proportionality test with regard to this
objective starts by repeating the finding in Digital Rights Ireland that the
review of discretion in case of a serious interference with the right to personal
data protection must be strict.42 TheAdvocate General then found it extremely
doubtful that the interferences respect the essence of Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter,43 and concluded that the “mass, indiscriminate surveillance” by US
intelligence services is “inherently disproportionate”.44 Regarding effective
oversight by an independent authority, the Advocate General observed that the
jurisdiction of the FTC is limited to commercial activities and that moreover
no supervisory authority is authorized to monitor possible breaches by US
intelligence agencies.45 For a multitude of reasons, the Advocate General
therefore advised the Court to declare the Safe Harbour decision invalid.
4. Judgment of the Court
The first notable point of the Court’s judgment came before any question of
law was discussed: in the overview of the “legal context” the Court included
lengthy references to the 2013 Communications from the Commission to the
European Parliament and Council that outline the failures of Safe Harbour and
the Commission strategy in remedying those failures. This foreshadows the
conclusions of the judgment.
Just like the Advocate General, the Court did not limit its answer to whether
national supervisory authorities are absolutely bound by a Commission
decision. Instead, it expounded the responsibilities of those authorities when
they receive a complaint from an individual concerning the adequacy of the
level of personal data protection offered by a third country.
38. Ibid., para 154.
39. Ibid., para 159.
40. Ibid., para 174.
41. Ibid., paras. 181–184.
42. Ibid., paras. 189–190.
43. Ibid., para 177.
44. Ibid., para 200.
45. Ibid., paras. 204–207.
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Most importantly, the Court stated that it is the task of national supervisory
authorities to examine with all due diligence claims from individuals
regarding the processing of their data in a third country that is the subject of a
Commission adequacy decision.46 The Court reached this conclusion after it
emphasized the primary importance of independent oversight for the
protection of the right to personal data. On earlier occasions, the Court
mentioned, it was explained that the independence of these national
supervisory authorities serves the effectiveness and reliability of the
monitoring of data protection rules.
The Court also observed that neither Article 28(3) of the Directive, nor
Article 8(3) of the Charter exclude international data transfers from their
scope of action.47 Although the national supervisory authorities only
supervise the application of the provisions of the Directive on their national
territory, the transfer of data itself can be considered to be a form of
processing occurring on a Member State’s territory and therefore falls under
the preview of the national supervisory authorities.48
More specifically relating to the relationship between Articles 28 and 25,
the Court clarified its statement in Lindqvist that Article 25 is part of a
“special regime”.49 The Court specified that Article 25 is complementary to
the general rules on personal data protection. The implication is that it is not a
special regime in relation to Article 28. It is therefore on the basis ofArticle 28
of the Directive and Article 8 of the Charter that national supervisory
authorities must examine claims from individuals regarding international data
transfers to countries subject to an adequacy decision.50 Another
interpretation would contradict the right, as guaranteed by Article 8(1) and (3)
of the Charter, “to lodge with the national supervisory authorities a claim for
the purpose of protecting their fundamental rights”.51 Moreover, Article 25
itself assigns the responsibility to certify the adequacy of the level of
protection in third countries both to the Member State and the Commission.
The duty for national supervisory authorities to examine claims from
individuals does not translate into a power to repudiate Commission adequacy
decisions. Here, the Court trod the well-beaten paths of EU law. In order to
guarantee legal certainty and the uniform application of EU law, national
courts and national supervisory authorities may not invalidate EU acts.
Instead, if a national supervisory authority is of the opinion that the claim of an
individual is well founded, it must present that opinion before a national court,
46. Judgment, paras. 47 and 63.
47. Ibid., para 54.
48. Ibid., paras. 44–45.
49. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596, para 63.
50. Judgment, para 47.
51. Ibid., para 58.
Case C-362/14 1353
as Article 28(3) of the Directive specifically provides that national
supervisory authorities must be able to engage in legal proceedings. A
national court must, if it shares the doubts of the national supervisory
authority on the protection of fundamental rights, then refer the matter to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling.52 If a national supervisory authority holds that a
claim is unfounded, the claimant may seek judicial redress before a national
court, which may then refer the matter to the ECJ.53
Following the reasoning of the Advocate General, the Court also assessed
the validity of Decision 2000/520, likewise taking into account facts that arose
after its adoption.54 The Court also took “an adequate level of protection” to
mean “essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union by
virtue of Directive 95/46 read in light of the Charter”,55 later rephrased as
“essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order”.56 Otherwise,
the high level of protection offered by the Directive and the Charter could
easily be circumvented. The Court added to this that the discretion of the
Commission is reduced here because of the important role of data protection
for the respect to private life and the large amounts of personal data concerned.
Judicial review of the requirements of Article 25 should be strict.57
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the adequacy assessment by the
Commission must be based on the domestic laws and international
commitments of the third country involved, as prescribed by Article 25(6).58
It is therefore not surprising that the Court concluded that Decision 2000/520
does not contain sufficient observations or conclusions on how the domestic
laws and international commitments of the US help secure an adequate level
of protection.59 More specifically, the broadly formulated derogations found
in the Decision allow for interference with the fundamental rights of those
whose data is transferred to the US, but no finding is made in the Decision
with regard to any rules adopted in the US to limit those interferences.60
Regarding the system of self-certification under Safe Harbour the Court
found that it “is not in itself contrary” to Article 25 of the Directive.61
However, such a system relies on effective mechanisms of detection and
supervision.
52. Ibid., para 65.
53. Ibid., para 64.
54. Ibid., paras. 67 and 77.
55. Ibid., para 73.
56. Ibid., para 96.
57. Ibid., para 78.
58. Ibid., paras. 69, 71, 73, 75 and 81.
59. Ibid., paras. 83, 96 and 97.
60. Ibid., paras. 87–88.
61. Ibid., para 81.
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Following the Advocate General, the Court highlighted two aspects of the
Commission’s findings from 2013: first, that US authorities were able to
access transferred personal data and process it beyond what was strictly
necessary and proportionate and, second, that data subjects had no means of
administrative or judicial redress in order to gain access to personal data.62
Concerning the first point, the Court reiterated its findings from Digital
Rights Ireland. In the EU, the Court stated, interferences with Articles 7 and 8
of the Charter require precise rules and minimum safeguards, so that
individuals have sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse of their data. In
particular, legislation allowing generalized access to the content of electronic
communication strikes at the essence of Article 7 of the Charter.63 On the
second point, the Court found that the lack of legislation providing for legal
remedies for individuals to access their personal data, or to obtain rectification
or erasure of personal data violates the essence of Article 47 of the Charter.
The Court concluded with a review of Article 3 of Decision 2000/520. It
read this provision as going beyond the implementing powers of the
Commission, because it limits the powers of the national supervisory
authorities as found in Article 28 of the Directive.64 In combination with the
problems affecting Article 1 of the Decision, the Court declared the Decision
to be invalid in its entirety.
5. Comments
The configuration of the Schrems case is unique. In cases such as Huber,
Schecke or Digital Rights, the Court was confronted with disputes between
individuals and public authorities and these were resolved through enhanced
judicial control over public authorities.65 Cases such as Promusicae orGoogle
Spain involved disputes between individuals and private corporations, and
these were resolved through balancing between conflicting rights and
enhanced responsibility of the private data controller.66 All of these cases were
framed as issues of individual protection in a digital world dominated by
public or private corporate players. In Schrems, the complaint lodged before
the Irish Commissioner concerned the behaviour of Facebook and the
62. Ibid., para 90.
63. Ibid., para 94.
64. Ibid., para 102.
65. Case C-524/06, Heinz Huber v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2008:724; Joined
Cases C-92 & 93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert, EU:C:2010:662;
Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland.
66. Case C-275/06, Promusicae, EU:C:2008:54; Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. AEPD
and Costeja Gonzalez, EU:C:2014:317.
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surveillance activities that were engaged by the US public authorities.
However, as framed by the High Court and then the ECJ, the dispute is about
the adequacy decision of the Commission concerning the transfer of data from
the Union to the United States and the institutional implications for the office
of the national supervisory authority. The case thus places the individual in
opposition to the public authorities and private corporations.
There are two main aspects in this case. Firstly, what is at stake is
institutional competition within the European Union where the two players –
the Commission and the national supervisory authorities – in the field are both
independent institutions responsible for the protection of European
individuals and their privacy. There were two possible options: one was to
subordinate the national player to the supranational one, so as to ensure
consistency and uniformity in supervision of international data transfers from
Europe; the other option was to disconnect one from the other, so as to expand
the venues through which scrutiny of international data transfers may be
obtained. The latter was the option chosen by the Court. In contrast with a
traditional bias towards centralization, this judgment gives rise to an
institutional configuration empowering national supervisory authorities. It
reflects a form of institutional trust shifting (5.1 below). Secondly, the case is
about the position of the EU as a big player in the field of protection of
personal data in a global context. Again there were two possible options: one
was to accommodate the EU system of protection to the conflicting interests
pursued by trade partners such as the US; the other was to accord precedence
to the higher level of data protection enshrined in EU law. The Court opted for
the latter. After the Kadi judgment, Schrems sounds like a further declaration
of independence of protective Europe, this time in the digital field (5.2). These
two choices are then seen in the light of related developments on data
protection (5.3).
5.1. A shift in institutional trust
Of the institutional actors involved in this clash between counter-majoritarian
institutions, the Commission is the apparent loser. The role of national
supervisory authorities is strengthened although in a rather ambiguous way.
For them, the judgment will mean a considerable addition to their workload.
Two other independent institutions take on greater responsibility for the
supervision of international data transfers: the national courts and the ECJ.
The most important innovation of the judgment is the explicit role awarded
to national supervisory authorities in examining whether a Commission
adequacy decision conforms with the Directive. Previously, national
supervisory authorities were only indirectly involved in such adequacy
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decisions, viz. through their so-called Article 29 Working Group, composed
of representatives of all the national supervisory authorities, of the European
Data Protection Authority and of the Commission. The Working Group
submits an opinion to the Commission on the level of protection in third
countries (Art. 30 Directive). This expansion of the role of national
supervisory authorities is mainly the result of the Court’s interpretation of
Article 8(3) of the Charter as given shape in the Directive by Article 28.67 The
fact that Article 28 is construed as a provision directly implementing a
requirement of the Charter, whereas Article 25 does not, appears to be the
main motivation behind the Court’s reasoning on the relation between these
Articles. As a result, the Court relies on Article 28 so as to empower national
supervisory authorities in the realm covered by Article 25, i.e. transfers of
data to third countries. In line with its own case law, the Court favours a view
of data protection authorities as fundamental rights supervisors over their role
as economic regulators concerned only with the well-functioning of the
market.68
On the one hand, the Court remains true to the spirit of the Directive. The
EU legislature clearly opted for a decentralized model of governance by
vesting data protection authorities at the national level.69 On the other hand,
however, it departs from the spirit of the classic EU decentralization model
that sets strict supranational limits to national authorities’ operation with the
aim of ensuring the effectiveness of EU policy objectives and enhancing
consistency across Member States. Competition policy is a case in point.70
Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that when national actors rule on
agreements which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they
cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the
Commission.71 True, this is in the framework of an exclusive competence
conferred on the Union and it concerns a specific decision on a given
67. In para 58, the Court makes the curious step of interpreting Art. 8(3) of the Charter as
meaning that an individual has the right to lodge a complaint with a national supervisory
authority. This would imply that the current form of monitoring of the right to personal data
protection being mainly in the hands of the national supervisory authorities may not be changed
for a completely centralized form of supervision.
68. Szydło, “Principles underlying independence of national data protection authorities:
Commission v. Austria”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), at 1816.
69. For the broader effects of decentralization for privacy protection, see Petkova, “The
safeguards of privacy federalism”, 20 Lewis & Clark Law Review (forthcoming 2016),
593–643.
70. Wilks, “Agency escape: Decentralization or dominance of the European Commission in
the modernization of competition policy?”, 18 Governance (2005), 431–452, at 431.
71. Monti, “Legislative and executive competences in competition law” in Azoulai (Ed.),
The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP, 2014), p. 117. This may be different
in the context of leniency programmes where more leeway is granted to national authorities, see
Case C-428/14, DHL v. AGCM, EU:C:2016:27.
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agreement. Data protection is a field of shared competence and the
Commission decision covers a broad set of practices in a foreign territory.Yet,
in other areas where independent national authorities are set up to ensure the
establishment of the internal market in field of electronic communications,
the creation of a level playing field is ensured through a supervising power
granted to the Commission.72 Moreover, this judgment stands in sharp
contrast with the development of new arrangements in the fields of economic
governance and financial regulation. In these fields, a move towards more
centralized intervention enhancing the powers of the Commission and EU
authorities is taking place.73
What is striking in this case is not that that the Court considers that the
activities of data protection authorities are entirely concerned with the
requirement of protection of fundamental rights, but the fact that their
independence is directed against any supranational influence or guidance. The
notion of independence of national supervisory authorities has not been
uncontroversial, with the Commission challenging the implementation of
Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46 in several Member States.74 The
Commission, followed by the ECJ, defended a broad understanding of the
notion of “complete independence” which not only requires a strict separation
from private market parties but also prohibits any direct or indirect influence
from the government and other public authorities. InCommission v.Germany,
the Court observed that the purpose of the independence was “to ensure
the effectiveness and reliability of the supervision of compliance with the
provisions on protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and must be interpreted in the light of that aim”.75 In Schrems,
this extends to independence from EU institutions and in particular the one
presented as the most trustable one for national authorities and the most
protective one for individuals, the European Commission.
It may be that the model that comes closest to the one designed by the Court
in this case is that of national courts vested with an EU mandate. Just as
national courts may be empowered on the basis of Article 47 of the Charter,
national supervisory authorities are directly vested through Article 8(3) of the
72. See e.g. Art. 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), O.J.
2002, L 108/33.
73. Chiti, “In the aftermath of the crisis: The EU administrative system between
impediments and momentum”, EUI Department of LawWorking Paper No. 2015/13 (2015).
74. Case C-518/07,Commission v.Germany,EU:C:2010:125; Case C-614/10,Commission
v. Austria, EU:C:2012:631; Case C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, EU:C:2014:237.
75. Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, para 25.
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Charter construed as a power-conferring norm.76 This connection between
institutional power, complete independence and protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data stems from the Court’s own case law.
However, this way of matching the objective of protection of individuals with
a specific institutional arrangement has a twofold negative consequence. First,
it obscures the fact that the supervisory authorities are not just concerned with
the protection of data subjects; rather, presumably, their task is to “ensure a fair
balance between, on the one hand, observance of the fundamental rights to
private life and, on the other hand, the interests requiring free movement of
personal data”.77 Second and conversely, the Commission is presented as the
holder of these interests requiring free movement of personal data not
particularly bothered by the protection of fundamental rights.
The Court’s apparent distrust towards the Commission is not without merit.
The negotiations on Safe Harbour were conducted as trade negotiations.78
Moreover, two years after the start of the re-negotiations of Safe Harbour the
Commission had not (yet) secured the necessary guarantees for an adequate
level of personal data protection. The assessment from 2013 that although the
current safeguards of the Safe Harbour decision were inadequate,
withdrawing the decision would adversely affect business interests clearly
showed the lopsided priorities of the Commission. In this instance, the
Commission is regarded by the Court as a political body and not as technical
body responsible for the oversight of Union law. Had the Court trusted the
Commission in sticking to its traditional role as a guardian of the rule of law,
the Court might have invalidated its adequacy decision whilst keeping the
national authorities fully subordinate to the Commission. Instead, it decided to
rely on supervisory authorities as trustees in the field of data protection. This
trust appears mainly to derive from a theoretical analysis of the position of
these national supervisory authorities (independence combined with
significant powers), rather than from any empirical observations of their
actual capacities.
Note, however, that the Court applies its reasoning only insofar as it
concerns the right to lodge a complaint with a national supervisory authority
(Art. 28(4)), the subsequent duty to examine that claim with all due diligence
76. On the connection between the requirement of effective judicial protection and the
empowerment of national courts, see Case C-432/05, Unibet, EU:C:2007:163; Joined Cases
C-317-320/08, Alassini and Others, EU:C:2010:146; Case C-93/12, ET
Agrokonsulting-04-Velko Stoyanov, EU:C:2013:432.
77. Case C-518/07, Commission v. German, para 24; Case C-288/12, Commission v.
Hungary, para 51; judgment, para 42.
78. Heisenberg,Negotiating Privacy:The EuropeanUnion, theUnited States, and Personal
Data Protection (Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2005), Ch. 4: “Keeping privacy advocates out of
the loop: Negotiating the Safe Harbor Agreement”.
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and the competence to engage in legal proceeding (Art. 28(3)). Yet, Article
28(3) also expressly awards the national supervisory authorities “effective
powers of intervention” including “imposing a temporary or definitive ban on
processing”. This is where the Advocate General and the Court diverge. The
Advocate General recognizes a power of the national authorities to suspend
data transfers on their own. The Court is more prudent. Supervisory
authorities should not be prevented “from examining the claim of a person
concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the
processing of personal data relating to him which has been transferred from a
Member State to that third country”. Here, the Court obviously allows a
restriction on the powers of the national supervisory authorities on the basis of
an adequacy decision. It is clear that if one does consider that Articles 25 and
28 regulate more or less the same subject matter, and thus that a Commission
adequacy decision is binding on all Member State organs, a compromise has
to be constructed. The compromise consists in keeping Article 28(4)
applicable (the fair processing of claims), whilst disregarding a part of Article
28(3) (the powers of intervention). It ensures that national supervisory
authorities are involved in the process, yet maintains that any serious issue
with a Commission decision may effectively be solved at the EU level through
a request for a preliminary reference.
This also leads to the main critique on the solution proposed by the
Advocate General. Granting all the 28 national supervisory authorities the
ability to effectively review personal data protection laws and practices in
third countries does not lead to a proper European solution and would thus
create a fragmentation in the level of protection. Also, it must be doubted
whether the analogous application of the exception found in N.S. is
appropriate here. The exception to the general application of EU law becomes
relevant where EU law has already failed to accomplish an appropriate
standard of protection. In Schrems, the question whether an appropriate level
of protection is guaranteed was still open, or in any case not settled at EU
level. Lastly, it must be noted that the differences are rather small between the
requirements for the application of the exception found in N.S. and the
requirements for the application of the exception as found in Article 3(1)(b) of
Decision 2000/520, raising the question why it was necessary to create
another exception.
That the Court focuses on the right to lodge a complaint and the power to
engage in legal proceedings, whilst setting aside the power to intervene, raises
questions concerning the overall position of these authorities. The Court
mentions several times that the supervisory authority must examine a
complaint concerning data transfers to a third country that allegedly does not
ensure an adequate level of protection, as based on Article 28(4) of the
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Directive. To this is added that the claim must be examined with all due
diligence.79 In this part of the argument, the Court does not mention the broad
investigative powers found in Article 28(3) of the Directive. This
interpretation seems to conflict with the assessment of validity of Article 3 of
Decision 2000/520. The Court states that Article 3, which outlines the
exceptional circumstances under which a national supervisory authority may
suspend data flows to an organization participating in Safe Harbour, must be
understood as unduly restricting the powers of the national supervisory
authorities. Article 3 of Decision 2000/520 thus awards the supervisory
authorities with a power (no matter how limited), that the Court itself has
denied to these authorities in the previous part of the judgment. It is then
difficult to see how this provision limits the powers of the national supervisory
authorities as described in the Directive. It is true that Article 3(1) of Decision
2000/520 was meant as the only action to be undertaken by national
supervisory authorities, and that the Court has greatly expanded the scope of
action of these authorities. By striking down Article 3, the Court thus appears
to want to reinforce its message on the role of those authorities, rather than
limit the discretion of the Commission to include narrowly tailored exceptions
in an adequacy decision.
That the Court does not mention the investigative powers of the supervisory
authorities raises the second question, namely that of the relation of these
authorities with the judiciary. The institutional framework created by the
Court awards a strong role to national courts. Even though the emphasis of
the judgment is on the tasks of national supervisory authorities, the role of the
national courts is in a way even more important, as a positive opinion of a
supervisory authority on the transfer of data as supported by a Commission
adequacy decision can be challenged before the national courts. National
courts and the preliminary reference procedure become the primary route to
challenge the legality of a Union legal measure. What is not obvious from the
Court’s interpretation concerns a case where the national authority considers
that the individual claim is well founded. According to Article 28(3) of the
Directive, national data protection authorities are the primary institutions that
engage with possible infringements of data protection rules. However, as
noted by both the High Court and the Advocate General, Schrems’s
complaints in this case did not really concern the behaviour of Facebook, but
the adequacy decision of the Commission. An organization transferring
personal data to a third country is thus an unlikely opponent for a national
79. The requirement to examine the claim with all due diligence is reminiscent of the
regime concerning the position of complaints in EU State aid law, where a compromise is to be
found between the wide margin of discretion accorded the Commission and the protection of
the complainants.
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supervisory authority. In that case, what legal question or what conflict should
be brought before the national court? If a national supervisory authority finds
fault with an adequacy decision, against whom should it then initiate legal
proceedings? When the Court leaves open the question what exactly the legal
conflict before the national courts will be in case a supervisory authority
wants to challenge an adequacy decision, this also opens up the possibility that
individuals might circumvent the national supervisory authorities and appeal
directly to a national court, challenging the behaviour of an organization as a
proxy.
That the ECJ is the final arbiter on the validity of adequacy decisions should
not come as a surprise. What matters is the procedure by which the case
arrives at the Court. What is surprising in that regard is that the national
supervisory authorities and the national court can bring a case to the ECJ
without first coordinating with the Commission. This is problematic for three
reasons. Firstly, it ignores without good reason Article 25(3) of the Directive,
laying down a requirement of mutual information for the Commission and
Member States about third countries’ level of protection of personal data.
Secondly, it deprives the Commission of an opportunity to use the internal
pressure for a higher level of protection for a strengthened external negotiating
position vis-à-vis third countries. Juxtaposing the somewhat more
business-friendly Commission with presumably more fundamental rights
oriented national supervisory authorities at the EU level can enhance the
credibility of the Commission when it comes to convincing third countries
about the value attached in Europe to personal data protection.Article 25(5) of
the Directive also hints at such a strategic interaction.80 Finally, it offers a
picture of a fragmented institutional landscape, setting apart the trustable and
non-trustable institutions. Instead, what are most needed are clear criteria to
apprehend transfers of data applicable to all institutions acting in the field.
5.2. A declaration of independence of digital Europe
In 1996, John Perry Barlow famously published the Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace.81 The point of it was to release the global digital
80. The A.G. found that “the purpose of the negotiations entered into with a third country
[under Art. 25(5) of the Directive] is to remedy the absence of an adequate level of protection
found in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 31(2) of that directive”. By viewing
the purpose of Art. 25(5) of the Directive in such black-and-white terms, the A.G. also misses
an opportunity to consider the strategic opportunities for international negotiations; see
Opinion, paras. 232–234.
81. Barlow, “A declaration of the independence of cyberspace”, 8 Feb. 1996, available at:
<www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>.
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community from any public regulation or intrusion.82 It soon became
clear that this declaration underestimated the phenomena of digital
commodification and institutional domination. Schrems may be seen as a
response to the risk that free online activities are turned into operations of
mass third State surveillance of European citizens. This is reflected in the
assessment of the validity of Decision 2000/520.
The Court had to reflect on the meaning of the notion “an adequate level of
protection”. This notion is at the heart of Article 25, but not described in more
detail. Article 25(2) describes how to measure adequacy, but does not provide
any clues as to the standard against which to measure. Citing fears of
circumvention, the ECJ found that “adequate” must mean a level of protection
essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by Directive 95/46 (as seen in the
light of the Charter). EU citizens are thus offered a consistent area of data
protection both within and outside the Union.83
The requirement of essentially equivalent protection is not unknown in
Europe. It comes very close to the Solange approach adopted by the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht in its ruling of 29 May 1974 when it had to
consider the level of protection of fundamental rights available at the
Community level. A level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the
German constitutional order is not required, but Germany is allowed to be a
member of the Community “as long as” the European Economic Community
provides for an “essentially comparable” standard of protection.84 It was also
the approach suggested by Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion in
Kadi.85 However, there are two ways of implementing a Solange approach:
either by requiring the conflicting system to make improvements to align with
its own standards of protection, leaving it a probationary time period, or by
requiring immediate adherence to standards equivalent to those guaranteed at
home.86 In this case, the Court decided to make the transfer of personal data to
the US dependent on strict and immediate adherence to EU standards. This is
also shown by its decision not to mitigate the temporal effects of its annulment
judgment.
82. Lindahl, ”We and cyberlaw: The spatial unity of constitutional orders”, 20 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies (2013), 697–730, at 703–708.
83. For the construction of this area within the EU, see Case C-524/06, Huber.
84. Mayer, “The force awakens: The Schrems case from a German perspective”, 16 Oct.
2015, available at <verfassungsblog.de/the-force-awakens-the-schrems-case-from-a-germ
an-perspective-2/>.
85. Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al
Barakaat, EU:C:2008:11.
86. On the first option, see Kuner, “The sinking of the Safe Harbor”, 8 Oct. 2015, available
at <verfassungsblog.de/the-sinking-of-the-safe-harbor-2>.
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This part of the judgment raises three issues. First of all, it may be
questioned whether it is appropriate to use the level of protection offered by
the Directive as a point of comparison, considering the restrictions on the
scope of application of the Directive. Article 3(2) of the Directive provides
that “this Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data in the
course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as
those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in
any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State
security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing
operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in
areas of criminal law”. The Directive sets no standards of protection
concerning these processing operations. By extension, the level of protection
as offered by that Directive cannot provide a yardstick when it concerns the
processing in third countries for the purposes of public security, defence,
criminal justice and law enforcement area.87 This was clearly pointed out by
the Court in thePNR case concerning the validity of the Commission Decision
2004/535/EC on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the
Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.88 Since it concerned public
security and the activities of a third State in areas of criminal law, the adoption
of the Commission decision was considered to be ultra vires.
In fact, the Court implicitly assumes that the processing of personal data
taking place in the context of the relationship between Schrems and Facebook
Ireland was commercial in nature, disconnecting it from the broader context
in which the data are made accessible to US national security agencies. It
assumes that the adequacy decision concerns processing of data as referred to
in Article 3(1) of the Directive. As a result, the Court never asks whether the
measures as adopted in the US would on this side of theAtlantic fall within the
scope of the Directive or not. The test of “essentially equivalent” is used in a
rather loose manner, as the Court and the Advocate General fail to answer this
question: essentially equivalent to what exactly? Perhaps as a way to solve the
problem, the Court refers at a certain point to the broader level of protection
87. But see the recently adopted Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, O.J. 2016, L 119/89 and Directive
(EU) 2016/681 of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, O.J.
2016, L 119/132. See further De Hert, “The new police and criminal justice Data Protection
Directive: A first analysis”, 7 New Journal of European Criminal Law (2016), 7–19.
88. Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, Parliament v. Council (PNR), EU:C:2006:346, paras.
54–61.
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offered “in the EU legal order”. It is true that the EU is becoming more active
on (public) security, especially with the adoption of the new Directive
2016/680 on the processing of personal data for criminal justice purposes; yet
in this area the division of competences between the EU and Member States
remains unsettled.89 On many topics of counter-terrorism, defence, and
security the EU legal order does not offer clear points of comparison. In this
case, the Court demands from third countries what it may not be in a position
to demand from the Member States.90 It must be remembered that the
Snowden revelations also uncovered involvement of UK intelligence services
in mass surveillance. Mass surveillance is not exclusively an American
practice.
This leads to the second issue, namely the role played by security in the
assessment of the validity of the adequacy decision. As the Court itself
observes, the right to personal data protection has to be balanced with the
value of free movement of data.91 However, no mention is made of the balance
that must be struck between data protection and security concerns. The mere
fact that, in the adequacy decision, “national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements” have general and absolute primacy over the safe
harbour principles means that the decision enables illegitimate interference
with the fundamental rights of data subjects. Such an access to content of
electronic communications, with no possibility for an individual to pursue
legal remedies, compromises the very “essence” of the fundamental rights to
respect for private life and to effective judicial protection. As noted by Tracol,
“this finding stands in stark contrast to the judgment of the Grand Chamber in
the case of Digital Rights in which the invalidation of the data retention
directive was based on the application of compliance with the principle of
proportionality”.92 Reading the Directive in light of the Charter allows the
Court to apply the methodology of Article 52 of the Charter referring to the
essence of fundamental rights and so to avoid getting into the need of
89. Directive (EU) 2016/680 (supra note 87) concerns transfers of personal data for the
purpose of “safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security” but it
excludes from its scope activities concerning national security, activities of agencies or units
dealing with national security issues and the processing of personal data by the Member States
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy. It is not clear whether counter-terrorism is to be related to “public security” or “national
security”.
90. Peltz-Steele, “The pond betwixt: Differences in the US-EU Data Protection/Safe
Harbor negotiation”, 19 Journal of Internet Law (2015), 14–27, at 23. However, see Case
C-698/15, Davis and Others, pending, on data retention in the UK in light of the decision in
Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland.
91. Judgment, para 42.
92. Tracol, “‘Invalidator’ strikes back: The harbour has never been safe”, 32Computer Law
& Security Review (2016), 345–362, at 357.
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balancing between privacy and security. Judging the conditions to transfer
data to third countries in this light, the Court could state that it did not need “to
examine the content of the safe harbour principles”.93
It also spared the Court from dealing with the issue of how reliable and
complete information concerning the third country can be obtained. In this
particular case, the Court had a relatively easy task, as it could rely on the
Commission reports drawn up in response to the Snowden revelations and the
High Court decision, which was also largely based on these publications. But
already in this case, the Advocate General’s Opinion was criticized by the
Americans for allegedly using out-of-date information.94 The issue of public
and reliable information is of course a broader problem in the supervision of
government intelligence agencies. In many instances it is only through leaks
and whistle-blowers that pertinent information becomes public. But when it
concerns third countries, the problems grow exponentially. Without the
information provided by Snowden, the Court would have had a much harder
task invalidating Safe Harbour. It may be especially challenging for the
national supervisory authorities to examine accurately claims about privacy
practices in third countries. Again, a mechanism of coordination between the
national supervisory authorities and the Commission might have been helpful
here in order to employ the more formidable resources of the latter to
investigate (and not merely examine) claims concerning the level of protection
in a third country.
The last issue is that the Court’s approach is primarily concerned with the
European aspects of personal data protection, without due regard to
international aspects. The Court equates the level of protection offered by the
Directive with the rights protected in the Charter. What is missing from this
approach is a sense of strategy about the manner in which the Commission can
act effectively on the international level. It can be doubted whether, in the
absence of internationally workable standards, the individual is indeed better
protected and whether in the absence of such standards the legal walls
imposed to restrict the flow of personal data are permeable in practice.95
International cooperation in personal data protection – though difficult – is
93. Judgment, para 98.
94. US Mission to the EU, “Safe Harbor protects privacy and provides trust in data flows
that underpin transatlantic trade”, statement of 28 Sep. 2015, available at <useu.usmis
sion.gov/st-09282015.html>. See also Swire, “Don’t strike down the Safe Harbor based on
inaccurate views about US intelligence law”, 5 Oct. 2015, available at <iapp.org/news/
a/dont-strike-down-the-safe-harbor-based-on-inaccurate-views-on-u-s-intelligence-law/>.
95. Kuner, op. cit. supra note 5, Chs. 7–8. This should also be seen in the light of an
increasing legal and technical difficulty to determine whether data transfers have taken place.
See Hon and Millard, “Data export in cloud computing: How can personal data be transferred
outside the EEA? The cloud of unknowing: Part 4”, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 85/2011 (London, 2012).
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probably the best way to close the gap between fundamental rights protection
on paper and in practice. However, it would be unfair to criticize the Court
harshly in this instance: sacrificing basic data protection rights by accepting
the practices as reported in this case would not only undermine the EU
concept of the rule of law, but would also encourage courts in Member States
to take the guarantees in their own hands and to question the primacy of EU
law over national law.96 International cooperation should not come at all costs.
Maybe subsequent cases will give the ECJ more opportunities to take account
of strategic considerations.
5.3. Looking forward
5.3.1. The privacy shield
The Court invalidated Safe Harbour on 6 October 2015 without limiting in
either direction the temporal effects of the judgment, thus requiring an
immediate response from the relevant institutions. Within a few days, the
Article 29 Working Party declared that before the end of January 2016 an
“appropriate solution” should be found, or the national supervisory authorities
would start to take enforcement actions.97 It noted furthermore that data
transfers on the basis of Safe Harbour are now unlawful, but Standard
Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules could still be used. In the
following months, the Commission negotiated a new agreement with the US.
The agreement, called the Privacy Shield, was announced early February
2016, and the Commission’s implementing decision was adopted on 12 July
2016.98
The comment from the Article 29 Working Party about Standard
Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules raises an important issue,
namely about the level of protection offered by these instruments. Even
though Article 26 of the Directive offers a derogation from the requirement
that a third country offers an adequate level of protection, the question is
whether these instruments are effective in protecting the right to personal data
protection.99 It is obvious that personal data transfers on the basis of Article 26
96. Kokott and Sobotta, “The Kadi Case: Constitutional core values and international law:
Finding the balance?”, 23 EJIL (2012), at 1015–1024.
97. Statement of the Article 29 Working Party on the implementation of the judgment of
the ECJ of 6 Oct. 2015 in the Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner case
(C-362/14), 16 Oct. 2015.
98. Commission Adequacy Decision of 12 July 2016, C(2016)4176 final, available at
<ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision_en.pdf>. See
also Commission Communication of 27 Feb. 2016, “Transatlantic data flows: Restoring trust
through strong safeguards”, COM(2016)117 final.
99. Kuner, op. cit. supra note 86.
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of the Directive must not infringe Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. As the
standard of “essentially equivalent” explicitly aims at preventing
circumvention of the high levels of protection offered by the Directive and
Charter, the system of derogations under Article 26 becomes problematic.100
The Privacy Shield is built on a similar approach of self-certification as
Safe Harbour, with the addition of several assurances regarding the activities
of US intelligence agencies, as well as some institutional innovations. The
latter include the creation of a recourse mechanism of last resort, the Privacy
Shield Panel, offering binding arbitration in disputes between individuals and
participating organizations, and an Ombudsperson with regard to complaints
concerning intelligence agencies.101
On mass surveillance, the Decision on the Privacy Shield refers extensively
to a Presidential Policy Directive, signed by US President Obama in 2014
(hence prior to the Schrems judgment), limiting the use of information
collected in bulk to six national security purposes, such as counterterrorism
and “detecting and countering certain activities of foreign powers”.102 Lastly,
it is interesting to note that the Commission recognizes the power of national
supervisory authorities to suspend data transfers if it believes a person’s
personal data is not afforded an adequate level of protection on the basis of
Article 28(3) of the Directive.103 Somewhat strangely it recognizes this power
by direct reference to the Schrems decision.104
This is not the place to assess in depth if and to what extend the Privacy
Shield will resolve the problems identified by the Court in Schrems. Suffice it
to note that opinions and resolutions by the Article 29 Working Party, the
EDPS and the European Parliament have so far been quite critical, especially
relating to the provisions on mass surveillance.105
100. The matter is already brought before the Irish High Court, with the Irish Data
Protection Commission seeking declaratory relief and a referral to the ECJ “to determine the
legal status of data transfers under Standard Contractual Clauses”; see Irish Data Protection
Commissioner, “Statement by the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner in respect of
application for Declaratory Relief in the Irish High Court and Referral to the CJEU”, 25 May
2016, available at <www.dataprotection.ie/docs/25-05-2016-Statement-by-this-Office-in-resp
ect-of-application-for-Declaratory-Relief-in-the-Irish-High-Court-and-Referral-to-the-CJEU/
1570.htm>.
101. Commission Adequacy Decision of 12 July 2016, C(2016)4176 final, Recitals 56–57
and 116–122. For the position of the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, see also Annex III.
102. Ibid., Annex VI, at 4.
103. Ibid., Art. 3.
104. Ibid., Recital 142. More than an interpretation of the Schrems decision itself, the
Adequacy Decision appears to anticipate the new Regulation, discussed infra, in confluence
with the Schrems decision.
105. Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield Draft
Adequacy Decision”, 13 April 2016, WP 238; European Data Protection Supervisor, “Opinion
on the EU-US Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy Decision”, 30 May 2016, Opinion 4/2016;
European Parliament, “Resolution on transatlantic data flows”, 26 May 2016, 2016/2727(RSP).
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5.3.2. The General Data Protection Regulation
In the background to the case, negotiations had been ongoing for a new
regulation on data protection, replacing the Directive.106 Proposed already in
2012, political agreement was reached in December 2015.107 The General
Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679, GDPR) will apply as from
May 2018.108 Adopted at the same time as the GDPR are a directive on the
processing of personal data for criminal justice purposes, including
the transfer of data by public authorities to third countries, and a directive on
the use of passenger name records (PNR).109 It falls outside the scope of this
case note to discuss the full implications of the new regulation and directives
for the transfer of data to third countries, only the main tenets of the new
regime for adequacy decisions in the GDPR are discussed.
The legal structure for personal data transfers remains largely intact.
Personal data transfers to third countries are allowed if the third country
ensures an adequate level of protection (Art. 45 GDPR), if appropriate
safeguards (Art. 46 GDPR) are adduced through, for example, Standard
Protection Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules (Art. 47) or on the basis of
derogations for specific situations (Art. 49 GDPR). The decision on whether a
third country (or an international organization, a territory or even specific
sectors in a third country)110 ensures an adequate level of protection is now
solely in the hands of the Commission, but the requirements for such decisions
are strictly described. Adequacy decisions must take into account “the rule of
law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation,
both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence,
national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to
personal data, as well as the implementation of such legislation, data
protection rules, professional rules and security measures, including rules for
the onward transfer of personal data to another third country or international
organization which are complied with in that country or international
organization, case law, as well as effective and enforceable data subject rights
106. See De Hert and Papakonstantinou, “The proposed data protection Regulation
replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A sound system for the protection of individuals”, 28 Computer
Law and Security Review (2012), at 130–142; Voss, “Looking at European Union data
protection reform through a different prism: The proposed EU General Data Protection
Regulation two years later,” 17 Journal of Internet Law (2014), at 11–22.
107. Commission, “Agreement on Commission’s EU data protection reform will boost
Digital Single Market”, 15 Dec. 2015, Press Release IP/15/6321.
108. Regulation 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 2016, L 119/1.
109. Directive (EU) 2016/680 and Directive (EU) 2016/681, cited supra note 87.
110. Blume, “EU adequacy decisions: The proposed new possibilities”, 5 International
Data Privacy Law (2015), at 34–39.
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and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose
personal data are being transferred” (Art. 45(2)(a)). Moreover, the existence
and functioning of an independent supervisory authority in the third country
must be taken into account. The Commission must monitor, on an ongoing
basis, developments in third countries and review its adequacy decision at
least every four years. The GDPR thus requires a wider-ranging assessment of
third countries than the Court demands on the basis of the Directive read in
light of the Charter, whilst maintaining “adequate” as the relevant standard.111
As for the institutional division of labour, the main question is whether
the Court’s interpretation of the Directive also applies to the GDPR. The
reasoning of the Court seems to suggest so, in particular with regard to the
duty of national supervisory authorities to examine individual complaints.
Noteworthy in that regard is that although Article 45 GDPR departs from the
procedures now found in Article 25 of the Directive, the tasks of the national
supervisory authorities remains in essence the same. The Court mainly relied
on Article 28 of the Directive, read in light of Article 8 of the Charter for the
institutional questions, with Article 25(3) of the Directive being used – maybe
in anticipation of the GDPR – only as a secondary argument. That the GDPR
elevates the Commission as the principal decision maker on the adequacy of
the level of protection of third countries therefore leaves the tasks of the
national supervisory authorities untouched.112
6. Conclusion
The Schrems case comes amidst a rapidly changing legal and societal
environment. The new Data Protection Regulation and the Privacy Shield are
just two very notable ones from a legal point of view. After the judgment was
announced in October 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels again threw
into doubt the balance being struck in our societies between privacy and
security. The Irish High Court observed poignantly in its preliminary
reference that Safe Harbour was from a more innocent age of data protection.
What may be expected from a Court in such times, or put differently, how
should we judge this judgment? Of course, we may expect the Court to enforce
the fundamental values that make up our legal order. However, an eagerness to
111. Adequacy decisions adopted by the Commission under the Directive remain in force
until amended, replaced or repealed according to Art. 45(9) GDPR.
112. Also see Art. 58(2)(j) GDPR, which gives national supervisory authorities the power
“to order the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international
organization”. It is doubtful whether in the absence of Schrems, this would have meant that
these authorities could interfere in cases where there is an adequacy decision.
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formulate red lines may soon lead to a loss of credibility. Ideally, the Court
uses its most powerful weapon of persuasion to give direction.
Invalidating Safe Harbour sends a strong signal towards audiences inside
and outside the EU about the importance of data privacy for the EU legal
order. In light of the Snowden revelations, the Commission’s own assessment
and the strong wording of the reference of the Irish High Court, Safe Harbour
simply could not stand. However, the act of invalidating Safe Harbour does not
by itself improve data privacy in Europe. Protecting the individual online from
institutional domination is a complex and long term project. It is unfortunate,
then, that the institutional shifts resulting from this decision are neither based
on strategic considerations, nor part of a narrative aimed at realigning the
priorities of the Commission.
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